It starts very young. Indeed, bright kids—those who do better on other academic indicators—are able to start lying at 2 or 3. “Lying is related to intelligence,”
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Although we think of truthfulness as a young child’s paramount virtue, it turns out that lying is the more advanced skill. A child who is going to lie must recognize the truth, intellectually conceive of an alternate reality, and be able to convincingly sell that new reality to someone else. Therefore, lying demands both advanced cognitive development and social skills that honesty simply doesn’t require.
I’d never seen this perspective before. Manipulating perception of reality is an act of intelligence and persuasion. That does make sense.
he most disturbing reason children lie is that parents teach them to. According to Talwar, they learn it from us. “We don’t explicitly tell them to lie, but they see us do it.
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Consider how we expect a child to act when he opens a gift he doesn’t like. We instruct him to swallow all his honest reactions and put on a polite smile.
This one is pretty common, from an early age lie to protect the feelings of adults. Schooled from a very early age to be polite through telling white lies. Also, the concept of lying to adults instead of tattling/telling on your mates seems to be a factor.
So, paradoxically, it seems lying is an integral part of a society which values honest.
Princeton have a great Youtube video and material on retrieving secret keys used in hard disk encryption called “Lest we remember: Cold boot attacks on Encryption keys”.
My quick summary of their material:
Memory takes some time to erase after a power shutdown
Putting a laptop to sleep still provides some power to memory
Keys can be recovered from memory
Disk encryption is probably vulnerable is a user puts their laptop to sleep (as keys are stored in memory)
While disk encryption will still increase security from casual or opportunistic theft of a laptop, it may not provide much protection from a targetted attack.
This seems a little ironic that software used to protect a laptop contents when it’s stolen or lost may not actually do so depending on if users shutdown or sleep. I can vouch that with Windows Vista on a laptop, bootup and shutdown takes way longer than putting the laptop to sleep. So, are your users taking convenient shortcuts to save time?
Anyway, back to Princeton, from their Abstract:
Contrary to popular assumption, DRAMs used in most modern computers retain their contents for seconds to minutes after power is lost, even at operating temperatures and even if removed from a motherboard.
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We use cold reboots to mount attacks on popular disk encryption systems — BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt — using no special devices or materials.
Physical access is always key to security. This style attack would suggest that sensitive information is still vulnerable if stored on a laptop. This then becomes a game of risk and probability for an organisation:
What is the chance of a targetted attack?
Is laptop theft occuring for corporate espionage or by drug addicts trying to get cash?
Is more “perception” damage caused by unprotected laptop theft? (I.e. Saying it’s encrypted reduces negative perception)
What is the value of the data on the laptop?
Is the information time sensitive? (e.g. Corporate Buyout within the month)
Is the information privacy related information which once released can not be changed (e.g. Date of Birth, Tax File Numbers, social security numbers)
What is the chance of a laptop thief knowning about recovering keys used in disk encryption?
What is the window of exploit once a laptop has been lost/stolen?
This is a great example of how physical access can really undermine security, even if encryption is used.